Michael Rider introduced the subject of the UK, Europe and euroscepticism. Great Britain had its own unique perspective on Europe. In the preceding centuries Britain had built up an empire. Hostilities with Europe were largely linked to rival empire-building. The British Empire survives through the pre-dominance of the English language. In the UK itself there had until very recently been clear geographical separation. Air travel eroded distances and the building of the Channel Tunnel provided the first permanent link with mainland Europe. But even now the symbolic “ditch” of the English Channel was maintained at airport controls.

Britain had a long, if ambivalent, relationship with the USA. Both language and culture had a common base, but over the last decade or so there had been a widening cultural gap, seen in growing chauvinism, in contrasting commitment to the old religions, and in attitudes to the US “muscular” policies. Much separation was focussed on unease with the current US presidency. The British Commonwealth survived only symbolically, though was a powerful network in sentiment.

In attitudes to European issues there was among thinking people considerable concern over imbalance in the media, though some ambiguity about the relative influence of the press vis-à-vis television or the internet.

Introducing the topic of migration in Europe Margaret Tuccori drew attention to the tendency in the UK to see migration as a matter of people moving into the UK. Yet there was a substantial outflow too.

The Decade of Roma Inclusion began in 2005. Over the whole of Europe the Roma were the largest ethnic minority. Traditionally mobile they had been particularly repressed within the borders of nation states. Beyond the current borders of the EU there were European peoples to the east, and Mediterranean peoples to the south. The relative wealth of Europe attracted “honeypot” migration. Migrant workers sometimes came from backgrounds of desperate poverty, working to send money home, but at the same time being absorbed into dependency on European standards of earning and the consumer culture. The early decision of the UK to allow free movement of workers had attracted far more migrant workers from central Europe and created difficulties that had not been anticipated. In southern Sussex migrant workers made a substantial contribution to the economy, but schools now had major problems with arranging equality of education for non-English-speaking children of migrants.

The Treaty of Lisbon was the topic underlying the next two discussions. Grace Blaker looked at the background to the recent fiasco of the Irish referendum. The population of Ireland represented some 0.2% of the total European population. In the referendum there was a 54% turnout, with 53% voting No and 46% voting Yes to ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. The Irish Constitution had required a popular referendum if the Treaty implied any significant change. Yet the treaty documentation lacked popular clarity, and was certainly too complex for public assessment. Irish political parties were internally divided on the issue, Sinn Fein being the only party overtly against. Ireland had done well from membership of the EU, receiving a total so far of some €40 billion. Fears had focussed on the loss of tax concessions, and the possible loss of its own nominated Commissioner in the EC.

Among several points that were made in ongoing discussion:

   Was the Lisbon Treaty deliberately unintelligible – a complex of legalistic amendments to previous treaties, impossible for a lay voter to absorb? The previous Treaty of Nice was clear enough, but even that had covered at least 70 separate issues.
   The reaction in other European countries varied from confusion to anger. In Poland the President had declined to sign what his Parliament had ratified; when the Czech Prime Minister and Foreign Minister attended a meeting in Brussels immediately after the Irish referendum, they had mutually contradicted each other on successive days; a Hungarian think-tank had drawn an analogy with terrorism – the “no” vote had been a destructive act by a tiny minority without any contingency policy on which to negotiate (the Hungarians had in fact been the first to ratify the Treaty in December 2007).
   One suggestion was that, historically, Irish neutrality since the 1930s had always been a sham.

Taking a more positive line, Martin Vasey then took as the last topic of the day “Where do we go after the Lisbon Treaty?”

The main issues were essentially the consequence of enlargement. The Commission had become less “collegiate”: than it used to be. The Treaty proposed reducing the number of Commissioners from 27 (1 per state) to 18, so that the effect would be that 9 states would not be represented on the EC at any one time.

   The EU will continue to function – the Lisbon Treaty was more of a panacea to ease ongoing problems.
   With less coherent decision-making on European issues there could well be a re-focus on global and environmental issues.
   Lack of public involvement (the “democratic deficit”) really depends on the lack of media coverage of European Parliament or European Commission business.
   The European Parliament, elected by the people, should have the right of taking initiatives; at present only the Commission initiates. The influence of the EP had been increasing, and is “consulted” by the Commission ever more frequently.
   Pan-European political parties? There is a threshold number of MEPs and number of states in order to form a EP political party. The UK Tories had been playing with the idea of forming a eurosceptic group with the Czech Civic democrats. But among the EP parties few ideological issues ever arise for discussion.
   The possibility of a two-speed Europe had been mooted in the past, particularly with eastern and Balkan countries in mind. Would it now be Ireland at one speed and the rest at another?

On the Saturday morning we met in brilliant garden sunshine for coffee, before starting the second study session, this time with topics introduced by our guests from Aumühle.

Uwe Diezmann introduced the topics chosen by his group. The first focus was on schools. What could schools do to help prepare children for European citizenship? The German curriculum includes the requirement to include European awareness. But problems lay in teachers’ awareness, with the time available within the demands of the set curriculum. Social problems within schools do much to distract from the time available for teaching.

The Europäische Bewegung Deutschland (European Movement in Germany) arranges talks in schools, supplemented by discussion. School heads allow two-hour sessions. Students’ level of ignorance, however, is high – even about their own country. The EBD tries to involve members of JEF (the Young European Movement) in school visits. Their own Schleswig-Holstein education authority requires all schools to have a teaching module on Europe available, into which students can opt. But there are an insufficient number of teachers capable of teaching the module.
   During the lively discussion that followed, Sarah Leigh described the initiatives recently underway in West Sussex to explore Europe within the curriculum context of Citizenship. (The group heard more about this in the next day's session - see Teaching about the EU in schools.)

Uwe Diezmann touched on the earlier topic of a two-speed Europe. He believed that inevitably the acceptance or otherwise of the Lisbon Treaty would be the dividing point, meaning faster and slower alternatives in the process of integration. It was not incompatible with the leitmotiv of “unity in diversity”. But there was a risk of wastefully having to establish a series of parallel institutions, something unlikely to appeal either to governments or electorates.


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Turkey – in or out? This was an intimate issue in Germany, with a recent history of regular worker migration from Turkey. Pro-EU sentiment in Turkey was largely favoured by commercial interests. Among Turkish people there was little evidence of support for ethical and social integration with European traditional values. Politically there was value in keeping Turkey “dangling”, in the hope of encouraging a consensual change in social & ethical values. Angela Merkel’s political party had been advocating a privileged treaty rather than membership. Within the EU as a 27-nation grouping there was prior need for a period of consolidation. Particularly with recent accession states there would be a period of “enforcement”, a phase that must first be passed through.

A useful paper by Dieter Lubeseder on German-Polish relations had been circulated in advance. The discussion expanded on this:
   There was a history of territorial conflict between Poland and what is now Germany (historically Prussia and Austria).
   Since 2004 the issue of Germans “expelled” from Poland after the 1945 had been revived from time to time. There were still substantial numbers of Germans who would return to visit their former family homes in what had once been Prussia.
   Significant attention had been paid to teaching history in schools: a book had been distributed recently on German-Polish history; it was parallel to an earlier book covering German-French history.
   In some parts of Poland today many people have Jewish ancestors. Poland has a reputation for anti-Semitism, but historically Poland was a liberal regime, hence available to Jews as a settlement area, whereas they were excluded from both Russia and Prussia.

On Sunday 29 June a final wide-ranging discussion was held covering a number of distinct themes, introduced and chaired by Uwe Dietzman. Salient points made from the chair and around the table included the following:

   Without ratification by all 27 Union states the Treaty was legally dead. The UK government’s policy was however to attempt to bring forward in one way or another those provisions that made for greater efficiency.  The UK Tory party, and probably most of public opinion, was opposed to any such revival attempts.

   In both Germany and among UK europhiles there was resentment against Ireland’s perceived ingratitude towards the EU. The Irish public had however been misinformed and manipulated by powerful and wealthy eurosceptics; the Irish elites were almost all in favour of the Treaty, and while Irish voters were not fundamentally opposed to the EU, many had resisted being ‘dragooned’ by their elites. In due course a re-presentation for approval of key Treaty provisions could be made to the Irish, and possible concessions offered to assuage national fears.

   The ratification processes in member states will continue, though there may well be problems in securing Czech approval. Meanwhile the Union will continue to function as now while ways are sought for key Treaty proposals not requiring formal legal implementation to be brought into use. This could be the case with the EU’s external diplomatic representation; in other instances it would be quite possible for certain of the Union’s administrations to act as if  the Treaty were in force. In addition the time scale set could ease implementation – the changes in voting rights in the Council, for instance, are not envisaged until 2014. Some Treaty provisions do however require formal validation within the legal framework of the EU. More generally, determined leadership will be needed to identify and assure acceptance of the Treaty proposals most likely to improve the effectiveness of the 27 member EU.

   Sarah Leigh spoke about her work with teachers of citizenship in West Sussex schools – she was shortly to take a group on a study tour of EU institutions in Brussels. Among the obstacles to such initiatives in the UK were the pressures on timetables from formal curricular subjects and the expense of paying for temporary replacement teachers. These were familiar issues too in the education systems of the German Länder. Particular to the UK however was the paucity of teaching about national political culture and institutions – or even citizenship until recently – and the reluctance of the political class to promote any awareness in schools of contemporary European institutions, developments and issues. The current UK debate on national identity rarely touched on wider affiliations beyond UK shores. Young peoples’ ignorance of basic European issues had been very apparent to the Sussex Branch members engaging with secondary schools over the past few years; working with teachers however had the potential for considerably greater success through a multiplier effect.

   Steffi Tiefenbacher had recently led groups of secondary school students from Schleswig-Holstein to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The EP has very effective programmes for dealing with school groups at this level and the visits had been very successful in developing student awareness and engagement.

   In Germany both the Federal State and the German European Movement at the national level will publish materials targeting the general public for the European Parliament elections. The European Movement in Schleswig-Holstein – population 2.8 million, roughly twice both halves of Sussex – has some 1600 members currently. (For comparison the European Movement in Germany as a whole has some 17,000 members, currently about half of its peak membership). Each Land receives a subsidy (€36 per member in Schleswig-Holstein) under contract with the Federal State to disseminate information on the EU to educational institutions and the general public; in addition to the EP elections other specific occasions are agreed for the production of materials e.g. Europawoche each May. There were differing attitudes towards particular European issues amongst Germans but the majority had fundamentally positive views of the EU.

   In the UK the situation was very different, with the main political parties all split on engagement with the EU or otherwise, and a vocal minority party, UK Independence Party (UKIP) - advocating withdrawal. As a result the European Movement was ‘party-politicised’, so that taking a pro-european stance was seen as a party-political position. Disseminating objective information about the EU was hence problematic; there was no financial support from the state for publishing factual material on the EU.

   At a practical level, the EM in the UK should promote the EP elections on non party-political grounds. Individual voting should be encouraged on the basis of opinion on specific Europe-wide issues, by stressing that these could be more effectively dealt with at a European rather than national level. Internal EU migrants have a vote – there should therefore be publicity aimed at migrants encouraging them to vote in favour of parties advocating support for the wider policies they benefit from. In a recent initiative Littlehampton Council in West Sussex had promoted reporting and advice in Polish in the local press for the benefit of its local Polish community – a model for other local councils in the run-up to the EP elections.

   In the UK the popularly influential local press on occasion reflected, as was the case in Sussex, the widespread ill-informed euroscepticism. Rebuttals putting the pro-European viewpoint were nonetheless published locally and there was no evidence for any consistent hostility towards such views. In preparation for the EP elections a renewal of letter-writing to the editors of local papers in both halves of Sussex would be a positive step.

President Sarkozy’s hardline ‘no enlargement without Lisbon’ was seen as oversimplistic and unhelpful. Time was now needed in the mature EU democracies for adjustment to the newly enlarged union and for EU institutions to achieve stability. In the cases of specific countries, Slovenia’s adoption of the euro and ethnic homogeneity – unusual in the Balkans – was noted; Croatia’s imminent adhesion was strongly supported by Germany as likely to create fewer stresses within the EU than Bulgaria and Romania; for the other Balkan states, removing the prospect of EU membership could be a step back towards the authoritarianism and conflict of the recent past. Turkey’s adhesion, opposed at present by Germany but supported by the UK, was seen in any case by both as a distant prospect – it was clear that only firmly established robust democratic and secular institutions could make Turkey acceptable to the EU.

   In the UK there was still great interest in the intra-German issue of the reunification that began nineteen years ago. The substantial transfer of funds continues and has had, especially in the bigger centres, a huge economic impact for the better – 20 years ago the DDR of 11 million people was bankrupt, its industry uncompetitive and unemployment high. In the countryside however much is still unreconstructed.

   Serious political tensions in relation to reunification continue to affect both the Wessies and the Ossies ; the two mentalities remain distinct. Generations in the east had grown up to accept state direction, and the acceptance of that personal responsibility characteristic of the Federal Republic may well take another two generations to achieve. In the west there is resentment that the 5% reunification tax is still payable - and to ungrateful recipients. And it is now clear that much of the spending from the west in the nineties was not effectively spent. Nonetheless though unemployment in Germany still stands at 3.5 million (but there is still a shortage of skilled engineers) many young ‘east’ Germans are working in the west where skilled work is available and well paid; this ‘emigration’ continues at a rate of some 140,000 a year. Sadly in the western half of Germany much of the progress made in the former DDR is talked down and the very real advances often unacknowledged.